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                  “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” 
                  - John Maynard Keynes, 19331 
 
1. Introduction 
Future historians will doubtless come to see the 2007-09 global financial crisis as 
an economic and financial disaster of first magnitude, a perfect storm of macroeconomic 
policy, financial architecture, and regulatory fault-lines that pulled whole populations into 
its vortex, leaving behind individual and collective damage that will take years to 
remediate.  
The only comparable crisis of this magnitude in modern times spanned the years 
1929-33, triggered bu an equity market crash that wiped-out almost 90% of the Dow-
Jones Index in the US alone, followed by epic banking and economic collapse - one that 
today remains etched into the public consciousness. Then as now, there was 
understandable political pressure on governments to “do something.” Then as now, 
there was no consensus on “what” should be done, beyond the immediate need to stop 
the bleeding and restore the lifeline utility functions of banking and financial 
intermediation. These have been classic examples of “learning by doing” on public 
policy, a process that cannot escape errors of judgment or second-guessing. But as the 
hurricane passes, as it always does, there soon comes a time to consider the longer-
term future - earnest efforts to find ways of avoiding avoid comparable disasters going 
forward, and to prevent immediate damage-control initiatives from making the next one 
even worse.  
Today as in the 1930s, the policy debates on how to repair a failed system center 
on regulatory reforms covering the key financial institutions and markets thought to be 
at the heart of the crisis. The reforms of the 1930s were as dramatic as they have been 
controversial in historical perspective. They doubtless extracted a cost in terms of 
economic and financial efficiency but produced critical gains in terms of financial 
stability and robustness – costs and benefits that are hard to calibrate given the inability 
to run the world twice. They certainly succeeded in creating a durable rules-based 
overlay for modern capital markets which persists more or less globally today. More 
controversially, they also set down barriers between commercial banking, and its public 
                                                            
1 Reply to a criticism regarding a Keynes flip-flop on monetary policy, as quoted in Alfred L. Malabré, Lost 
Prophets: An Insider's History of the Modern Economists (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1994), 
p. 220 
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utility characteristics, and what were then considered the far riskier activities comprising 
investment banking.  
This functional separation of financial intermediaries, in the form of the Glass-
Steagall provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, came to be widely derided as 
unnecessary and ill-advised, and undoubtedly triggered unintended financial and 
economic consequences in the years that followed - some positive and some negative. 
Nonetheless, the Glass-Steagall provisions were associated with some 66 years of 
relative financial stability in what turned out to be an extremely turbulent world.  
Today, less than a year after coming perilously close to a global financial 
meltdown, no meaningful financial system reforms have been agreed. Paradoxically, 
efforts to stem the short term bleeding have created even greater financial 
concentration, systemic risk exposure and moral hazard in global wholesale finance. 
And the more successful players are back to business as usual, with virtually no 
contrition and only cursory acknowledgment of those to whom they owe their survival, 
even as many of their erstwhile competitors remain wards of the state. The “animal 
spirits” of wholesale markets will not be tamed, nor should they be. Great zoos require 
great tigers, crocodiles and zebras. But they also require trained keepers, deep moats 
and high fences. In the real world of political influence-peddling and regulatory-capture 
– what Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein has called “our seventh line of business”2 
– it is possible that the public interest can best be served by a coordinated global 
reinstatement of functional separation among financial intermediaries that create 
systemic risk. 
This paper reexamines that separation in the context of modern wholesale 
financial environment, dominated as it is by a small number of “special” institutions 
whose failure can trigger global financial disaster. Section 2 of the paper traces the 
pathology of regulation and deregulation from the watershed events of the 1930s to the 
systemic failures of the recent past. Section 3 discusses the structure, conduct and 
performance of the wholesale financial industry and how firms that cannot be allowed to 
collapse get that way. Section 4 examines the available regulatory techniques and 
makes some judgments as to their relative promise in promoting future financial stability 
with least possible dislocation of financial efficiency. Section 5 evaluates functional 
separation and carve-outs of high-risk activities that cannot defensibly be conducted 
within systemic financial firms – running casinos inside public utilities – in the real world 
of power politics and regulatory capture. The paper concludes that blanket 
condemnation of the functional-separation aspect of the 1930s financial reforms is 
unwarranted in the light of ongoing experience, and that it is time to revisit this issue in 
reconfiguring the global wholesale financial architecture.  
                                                            
2 New York Times, 18 July 2009 at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/business/19dimon.html?pagewanted=all 
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2. Legacies of the Past 
The so-called Glass-Steagall Act actually consists of four provisions of the 
Banking Act of 1933, arguably the most substantial piece of financial legislation to 
emerge from the Great Depression – legislation that also encompassed deposit 
insurance and other reforms designed to restore and maintain financial stability. One of 
its key provisions mandated a virtually complete separation of investment banking from 
deposit-taking activities. The Act thus eliminated involvement by firms with a 
commercial banking charter in the securities business – specifically, underwriting and 
dealing in corporate debt and equity securities and municipal revenue bonds 
(obligations not guaranteed by the full faith and credit of municipal governments). That 
business, which gained dramatically in volume during the 1920s, was dominated by an 
amalgam of universal banks such as JP Morgan and National City Corporation and 
broker-dealers banks such as Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers. The former were 
listed companies engaged in a full array of commercial and investment banking 
activities, and the latter were private partnerships engaged mainly in securities 
underwriting and trading, and investing their partners” capital. 
 
Senator Carter Glass and other contemporary critics of the universal banking 
model feared that bank involvement in securities underwriting had directly and indirectly 
led them to ramp-up (warehouse) their holdings of long-term financial instruments, 
exposing themselves to potentially dangerous market, credit and liquidity risk. When this 
risk materialized with a vengeance, it was thought to have contaminated the entire US 
financial system by triggering the collapse of banks nationwide, which in turn had 
disastrous consequences for the real economy. About 40% of all US banks failed during 
this period, undermining their role as financial intermediaries and cutting off the air 
supply to the real economy.  
 
The fact is that the big universal banks did increase their holdings of equities 
long-term debt securities during the 1920s, probably because the demand for short-term 
corporate loans declined substantially. But there is little evidence that the quality of bank 
securities holdings was responsible for the cascading bank failures of 1930-1933. 
Rather, the Federal Reserve System”s unwillingness to provide liquidity to a banking 
system beset by depositor runs was largely responsible for the banking collapse of the 
time. Under the circumstances that existed at the time, most of the  banks that failed 
would have collapsed even if they had held no long-term bonds at all. [Walter, 1986] 
Evidence that commercial banks” securities activities somehow directly caused the 
Great Depression has remained elusive. The indirect causality, however, is a different 
matter. 
 
Moreover, reevaluation of the historical events preceding passage of the Banking 
Act of 1933 suggest that the large universal banks of the time did not in fact exploit 
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conflicts of interest that arose from their roles as commercial lenders and securities 
underwriters – for example using their privileged insight as lenders to prompt clients to 
issue securities and use the proceeds to repay commercial loans, thereby shifting 
losses from themselves to investors. The evidence? Securities underwritten by 
(potentially conflicted) universal banks did not underperform those underwritten by (non-
conflicted) investment banks.3 And most of the financial abuses that did occur in the 
1920s would have been effectively prevented by modern security markets regulation 
that itself was a product of contemporaneous financial reforms – the Securities act of 
1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Investment Company Act of 1940. 
Most of the questionable transactions that appeared to have occurred between banks 
and their securities affiliates would have been deemed illegal under the financial laws 
and regulations tht followed. The emphasis of reformers in the 1930s was to prevent a 
recurrence of the situation rather than to seek retribution and punishment for those held 
to be responsible and they did what they did in good faith, under enormous pressure 
and in the “fog of war,” where things that later became evident with the benefit of 
hindsight remained largely opaque.  
 
The Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 forced the dissolution 
of the universal banks – for example the breakup of JP Morgan into the Morgan Bank 
(which in 1959 merged with the Guaranty Trust Company to form the Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company of New York, the nation”s premier wholesale commercial bank) and 
what later became Morgan Stanley (of the nation”s top investment banks). Continental 
Europe, in contrast, engaged in no such functional separation and largely continued 
with the universal banking tradition, complemented by a few independent securities and 
advisory firms mainly in Italy (notably Mediobanca), France (the banques d”affaires) and 
the Netherlands. The UK went its own way with a commercial banking structure 
centered on a short list (determined by the Bank of England) of publicly listed clearing 
banks and a long tradition in the securities sector of “single capacity” jobbers (dealers), 
brokers and merchant banks, which was changed in Britain”s 1986 “Big Bang” reforms 
to allow the formation of broker-dealers, integrated investment banks and investment 
banking divisions of universal banks and financial conglomerates. In 1948 Japan was 
forced under the US occupation to adopt a version of the Glass-Steagall provisions in 
Article 65 of the Japan Securities and Exchange Law, which contained strict separation 
of commercial and investment banking.  
 
Without access to the markets for deposits and commercial loans but protected 
from competition by commercial banks, US investment banks” share of financial 
intermediation grew rapidly as financial flows progressively shifted from the balance 
sheets of commercial banks and other credit institutions to the financial markets. They 
                                                            
3 See  for example Gande, Puri, Saunders and Walter [1997], Gande, Puri and Saunders [1999], Puri 
[1994] and Puri [1996]. 
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in turn had a great deal to do with accelerating this process. Commercial paper markets, 
high-yield securities, asset securitizations, money market mutual funds and similar 
innovations were in part of product of investment banks” successful incursions into the 
credit institutions” market share, aided by the substantially lighter regulatory burdens 
they had to bear (notably capital requirements and liquidity requirements). By the 1980s 
the US had become heavily market-dominated while other financial systems remained 
universal bank-dominated, with the dominant banks heavily resistant to cannibalization 
of profitable business at home. This structural difference may have had something to do 
with a persistently higher US rate of economic growth during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
so-called Anglo-Saxon financial architecture was arguably more efficient, more 
disciplined and more innovative that the bank-dominated system. If true, then the Glass-
Steagall legislation may have paid handsome growth dividends for over half a century, 
dividends that might have been forgone if the US had persisted with a universal banking 
model after 1933. 
 
Internationally as well, a consequence of Glass-Steagall may have been the 
progressive dominance of US investment banks in rapidly-evolving global capital 
markets. American broker-dealers, whose competitiveness was enhanced by the 
disappearance of fixed brokerage commissions in the SEC”s “Mayday” financial reforms 
in 1974, began a sustained offensive in foreign and offshore financial markets. 
Penetrating the fortresses of universal banking in one country after another, they 
mounted a sustained 20-year battle to wean European and later Asian corporates from 
their reliance on “Hausbank” relationships with universal banks, offering lower funding 
costs and innovative financings. Meanwhile, they cultivated the buy-side of the market, 
insurance companies, pension funds and other institutional investors, with new 
investment alternatives and ideas to improve portfolio efficiency. The offensive was so 
successful that virtually all the major universal banks in Europe mounted vigorous 
efforts to develop investment banking divisions of their own, but without having been 
battle-tested or having a viable footprint in the world”s largest securities market. By the 
early 1990s American investment banks basically dominated their industry worldwide, 
with a market share of about two-thirds – see Exhibit 1 for the market share data during 
2004-05, two relatively normal years in global financial markets. And investment 
banking developed into one of the top US export industries – arguably another fortuitous 
consequence of Glass-Steagall. Had universal banking remained in place in the US 
after 1933, the lack of competitive pressure across very different strategic cohorts might 
well have involved significant opportunity costs. 
 
Meantime, US wholesale commercial banks - notably Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company, Bankers Trust, Chase Manhattan and Citicorp - began to agitate for 
reinstatement of universal banking powers to redress what they had come to regard as 
a debilitating competitive disadvantage. While they could and did compete vigorously in 
government bond, foreign exchange and other traded markets as well as corporate 
advisories, they were hamstrung in the “Glass-Steagall illegal” sectors of the market that 
were critical for competing in corporate finance. So the 1980s saw a spate of political 
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initiatives to get the rules changed. These included “high-road” arguments that the 
structure of financial intermediaries should be driven by competitive and strategic 
consideration, not anachronistic legislation. [Saunders and Walter, 1996] They also 
included “low road” initiatives such as Bankers Trust”s illegal underwriting of commercial 
paper in 1985, and then letting the courts decide the merits (Bankers Trust won). 
  
By the late 1980s, commercial banks had gained the limited right to sell 
investment and insurance products to retail customers, as well as the right to operate 
separately capitalized, size-constrained wholesale securities subsidiaries (so-called 
Section 20 subsidiaries) under various safeguards to prevent the commercial banking 
from contamination by possible investment banking losses. This came in the form of 
administrative rulings on the part of the regulators, not legislative change. Perhaps a 
dozen of the major wholesale commercial banks took early advantage of this 
progressive liberalization to build significant securities subsidiaries, especially in the 
bond business, to complement their powerful wholesale commercial banking and 
government bond activities and their emerging presence in corporate advisory work. 
One key area in which the commercial banks made little headway was equities, a highly 
profitable growth market that was far removed from their traditional expertise in debt 
finance, and in which they had little sales and trading expertise and few natural 
relationships with companies undertaking IPOs. Moreover, lack of a market presence in 
equities seriously hampered their ability to build a competitive fee-based corporate 
finance business. This gap in their activity range lent even more urgency to removal of 
the remaining Glass-Steagall restrictions though legislative action.  
With the political ducks lined-up for deregulation and the camel”s nose well under 
the tent through Section 20 subsidiaries, the merger in April 1998 of Citicorp and 
Travelers – illegal at the time but permitted under a two-year extendable grace period – 
simply ignored the remaining functional barriers on the assumption that they would soon 
be lifted. This bold preemptive strike was soon validated by passage of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (GLB), and itself may have 
accelerated the change in regulation. 
Passage of GLB by an overwhelming Congressional vote of 343 to 86 put the 
final nail into the coffin of functional separation in US financial intermediation. At the 
retail level, it allowed commercial banks to gather assets into both bank deposits and 
securities accounts such as money market mutual funds, helping to stem the incursion 
by broker-dealers into their traditional client base and broadening their ability to respond 
to changes in client preferences. At the wholesale level, GLB allowed commercial banks 
to underwrite and trade in corporate debt, corporate equities and municipal revenue 
bonds and compete head-on with the broker-dealers. Together with repeal of the 
McFadden Act, which had limited interstate branching, with passage of the Riegel-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, the stage was set for a return 
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to full-blown universal banking in the United States with few regulatory constraints on 
scale and scope in financial intermediation.  
Among the remaining constraints, the 1999 deregulation did not remove the 
restrictions on banks under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC), which 
prevented financial institutions from owning non-financial corporations. It conversely 
prohibits corporations outside of the banking sector from entering deposit taking and 
commercial lending. This prompted many nonfinancial corporations such as General 
Electric and BMW to set up industrial loan corporations (ILCs), mainly chartered in Utah, 
which enabled them to take FDIC insured deposits and make commercial loans despite 
the BHC prohibition. It also allowed broker-dealers and investment banking units of 
financial conglomerates to set up FDIC-insured ILCs to offer their clients in the form of 
brokerage sweep accounts. Remaining in place was a cap of 10% on total US deposits 
booked by any single bank holding company, although the largest financial 
conglomerates soon lobbied for  the cap to be be lifted - Bank of America, for example, 
argued that the cap makes U.S. banks vulnerable to foreign acquirers by limiting their 
ability to buy non-US banks that have significant domestic deposits.4 
As in with the imposition of Glass-Steagall 66 years earlier, GLB”s sweeping 
functional separation had some dramatic if unintended consequences. 
Within two years of deregulation, every major commercial bank that took full 
advantage of its new access to investment banking was involved in the most serious 
spate of corporate scandals of modern times - including the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom - resulting in large losses for the banks themselves and their investor clients, 
major fines and legal settlements, and a general erosion of confidence in financial 
markets. Using their enormous balance sheets, the new financial conglomerates had 
become fee-chasing Goliaths that were played-off by rogue clients against each other 
and against the independent investment banks. As well, each was embroiled in major 
regulatory violations and exploitation of conflicts of interest, including corrupted equity 
research, facilitating late trading and market timing by hedge funds against the interests 
of ordinary shareholders of in-house mutual funds, and acting simultaneously as 
investor and intermediary in corporate actions. 
Less than a decade after deregulation, these same financial conglomerates were 
at the center of the global financial crisis that began in 2007 as they chased after market 
share in the securitization business and aggressively followed along as the action 
increasingly involved dodgy credits ranging from sub-prime mortgages to leveraged 
loans. Besides encountering “pipeline” exposure to market, credit and liquidity risk in 
pursuit of a booming business, the financial conglomerates also took on “warehouse” 
exposure on their massive balance sheets or in off balance sheet conduits set up to 
avoid regulatory capital requirements. [Acharya and Richardson, 2009] Most would 
have failed in 2008 had they not by then become “systemic” institutions and 
                                                            
4 Sybil White, “Riegle-Neal”s 10% Nationwide Deposit Cap: Arbitrary and Unnecessary,” 
http://studentorgs.law.unc.edu/documents/ncbank/volume9/cybilwhite.pdf 
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beneficiaries of the largest corporate bailouts in US history, with massive socialization of 
the risks that they had assumed in executing their universal banking strategies. 
The archetype of financial conglomerates and catalyst in accelerating 
reregulation, Citigroup, became the poster child for failed financial conglomerates, a 
death-star that virtually wiped-out its shareholders, dependent entirely on taxpayer life-
support for its continued existence, and ultimately had to be partially nationalized with a 
34% government shareholding – see Exhibit 2. 
 
3. How Systemic Financial Firms Get that Way 
Industrial economics suggests that the structural form of competition between 
firms active in a given financial intermediation function, or in multiple functions should 
follow the dictates of institutional comparative advantage. If there are significant 
economies of scale, or economies of scope with respect to either costs or revenues, or 
if there are important linkages that can be exploited across geographies or client 
segments, we would expect to see the advantages reflected in, respectively, the size, 
the range of activities or the geographic scope or client breadth of those firms that are 
the most successful. 
A Simple Strategic Schematic 
Exhibit 3 depicts the market for financial services as a matrix of clients, products and 
geographies. [Walter, 2006] Financial firms clearly will want to allocate available 
financial, human and technological resources to those cells in the matrix (market 
segments) that promise to yield the highest risk-adjusted returns. In order to do this, 
they will have to attribute costs, returns and risks appropriately to specific cells in the 
matrix, and the cells themselves must be linked together in a way that recognizes and 
maximizes what both analysts and practitioners commonly call “synergies.”  
Client-driven linkages (horizontal arrows) exist when a financial institution can, as a 
result of serving a particular client or client-group, supply financial services more 
efficiently either to the same or another client in the same group in the same or different 
geographies. Risk-mitigation results from spreading exposures across clients, along 
with greater earnings stability to the extent that income streams from different clients or 
client-segments are not perfectly correlated. 
Product-driven linkages (vertical arrows) exist when a firm can supply a particular 
financial service in a more competitive manner because it is already providing the same 
or a similar financial service in other client or geographic dimensions. Here again, there 
is risk mitigation to the extent that net revenue streams from different products are not 
perfectly correlated. 
Geographic linkages (lateral arrows) are important when an institution can service a 
particular client or supply a particular service more efficiently in one geography as a 
result of having an active relationship with that client, or presence in that financial 
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product, in another location. Once more, the risk profile of the firm may be improved 
where business is spread across different currencies, macroeconomic and interest-rate 
environments. 
To extract maximum returns from the strategic positioning matrix, firms need to 
understand the size, growth and competitive dynamics of specific market segments, as 
well as the costs and the risks embedded in their overall portfolio of activities. 
Optimizing the linkages between the cells, in order to maximize potential joint cost and 
revenue economies, can be and especially challenging task. Firms that do this well can 
be considered to have a high degree of “strategic integrity” which should be reflected in 
a market capitalization that exceeds the stand-alone values of their constituent 
businesses. At the same time, exploiting the potential of the market matrix across 
revenue, cost and risk synergies engages the firm in higher levels of managerial 
complexity, conflicts of interest and other issues that could well be value-destroying. 
The existence of large and complex “systemic” financial intermediaries suggests 
either that the benefits of size and complexity do in fact exceed their costs, that there 
are widespread failures in market discipline and effective corporate governance, or that 
size and complexity itself gives rise to an unpriced subsidy representing a transfer of 
wealth from society at large to the shareholders and employees of financial 
intermediaries. 
Economies and Diseconomies of Scale  
The question as to whether economies or diseconomies of scale exist in financial 
services has been at the heart of strategic and regulatory discussions about optimum 
firm size in the industry. Are larger firms associated with increased scale economies 
and hence profitability and shareholder value? Does increased average firm size create 
a more efficient financial sector? Answers are not easy to find, as it demands isolating 
the pure impact of size of the production unit as a whole from all the other revenue and 
cost impacts of size, as discussed below. In an information- and transactions-intensive 
industry such as financial services, which often has high fixed costs, there should be 
ample potential for scale economies. However, the potential for diseconomies of scale 
attributable to disproportionate increases in administrative overheads, management of 
complexity, agency problems and other cost factors can also occur in very large 
financial services firms. If the economies prevail, increased size will help create financial 
efficiency and shareholder value: if the diseconomies prevail, both will be destroyed. 
Many studies of economies of scale have been undertaken in the banking, 
insurance and securities industries over the years.5 Unfortunately, examinations of both 
scale and scope economies in financial services are unusually problematic. The limited 
availability and conformity of data present serious empirical issues, and the conclusions 
of studies that have detected (or failed to detect) economies of scale and/or scope in a 
sample of financial institutions do not necessarily have general applicability. 
                                                            
5 A. N. Berger and D. B. Humphrey, Measurement and efficiency issues in commercial banking, in Output 
measurement in the service sector, ed. Z. Griliches, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (1992); I. 
Walter I. Mergers and Acquisitions in Banking and Finance. New York: Oxford University Press (2004). 
11 
 
Nevertheless, the impact on the operating economics of financial firms is so important 
that available empirical evidence is central to the whole argument. 
Cost estimation has uniformly found that economies of scale are achieved with 
increases in size among small commercial banks (below $100 million in asset size).6 A 
few studies have shown that they may also exist in banks in the $100 million to $5 
billion range.7 However, there is limited evidence to date of scale economies in the case 
of banks larger than $5 billion, and although there has been some recent scattered 
evidence of scale-related cost gains for banks up to $25 billion in asset size,8 there is 
none for very large banks (exceeding $25 billion). Some studies have found the 
relationship between size and average costs to be U-shaped, suggesting that small 
banks can benefit from economies of scale as they grow bigger, but that large banks 
seem to suffer from diseconomies of scale and higher average costs due to factors like 
complexity as they increase in size.  
The inability of empirical research to find significant economies of scale among 
large financial services firms is also true of the larger insurance companies and broker-
dealers." The consensus seems to be that scale economies and diseconomies do not 
generally result in more than about 5% difference in unit costs.9 In fact, except for the 
very smallest banks and nonbank financial firms, firm-wide scale economies seem likely 
to have relatively little bearing on competitive performance. This is particularly true since 
smaller institutions are sometimes linked together in cooperatives or other structures 
that allow them to harvest any available economies of scale centrally, or are specialists 
in specific market-segments that are not particularly sensitive to such relatively small 
cost differences.  
An underlying research problem is that most empirical studies focus entirely on 
firm-wide scale economies although the really important scale issues are encountered 
at the level of individual business units. There is ample evidence, for example, that 
economies of scale are significant for operational and competitive performance in areas 
such as global custody services, mass-market credit card transaction processing and 
institutional asset management. But they may be far less important in other areas, such 
as private banking and M&A advisory services. Unfortunately, empirical data on cost 
functions that would allow researchers to identify economies of scale at the product 
level are generally proprietary, and thus unavailable. Still, it seems reasonable to argue 
that a scale-driven strategy may make a great deal of sense in specific areas of 
financial activity, even in the absence of evidence that there is very much to be gained 
at the firm-wide level. And since observations of firm-wide economies of scale are 
elusive, the notion that some lines of activity are likely to benefit from scale economies, 
suggests there must be other lines which suffer from diseconomies of scale. 
                                                            
6 M. M. Cornett and H. Tehranian, Changes in corporate performance associated with bank acquisitions, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 31, 211-234 (1992). 
7 M. M. Cornett, G. Hovakimian, D. Palia and H. Tehranian, The impact of the manager-shareholder 
conflict on acquiring bank returns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27 103-131(2003).  
8 J. Houston and M. Ryngaert, The overall gains from large bank mergers, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 18, 1155-1176. (1994). 
9 A. Saunders and I. Walter, Universal Banking in the United States, New York: Oxford University Press 
(1994). 
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Operating Efficiencies 
Quite apart from the conventional economies of scale and scope just discussed, 
financial firms of roughly the same size and providing roughly the same range of 
services (i.e., where scale and scope are identical) can in fact have very different cost 
levels per unit of output. There is ample evidence that such performance differences 
exist, for example, in comparisons of cost-to-income ratios among banks, insurance 
companies and investment firms of comparable size. The reasons involve differences in 
production functions, reflecting efficiency in the use of labor and capital, sourcing and 
application of available technology, and acquisition of inputs, organizational design, 
compensation and incentive systems – i.e., in just plain better or worse management.  
A number of studies have found that disparities in cost structures among banks 
of similar size can be rather large, suggesting that the way banks are run is more 
important than their size or the selection of businesses they pursue. The consensus of 
studies conducted in the United States seems to be that average unit costs in the 
banking industry lie some 20% above those of “best practice” firms producing the same 
range and volume of services, and that most of the difference can be attributed to 
operating economies rather than to differences in the cost of funds.10 If true, this is good 
news for smaller firms, as it suggest that the quality of management is far more 
important in driving costs than raw size or scope. Of course, if very large institutions are 
larger because they have been systematically better managed than smaller ones (which 
may be difficult to document in the real world of financial services) there may indeed be 
a link between firm size and operating efficiency. The performance of various banks of 
different sized during the financial crisis of 2007-09 raises severe doubts about this 
proposition, however.  
It is also possible that very large organizations may be more capable of making 
the massive and “lumpy” capital outlays required to install and maintain the most 
efficient information-technology and transactions-processing infrastructures. If such 
extremely high recurring technology spend-levels result in greater operating efficiency, 
large financial services firms will tend to benefit in competition with smaller ones. 
Smaller firms will then have to rely on pooling and outsourcing where this is feasible. 
Cost Economies of Scope 
Beyond pure scale-effects, are there cost reductions to be achieved by selling a 
broader rather than narrower range of products? Cost economies of scope mean that 
the joint production of two or more products or services is accomplished more cheaply 
than producing them separately. “Global” scope economies become evident on the cost 
side when the total cost of producing all products is less than producing them 
individually, while “activity-specific” economies reflect the joint cheaper production of 
particular pairs or clusters of financial services. Such economies can be harvested 
through the sharing of IT platforms and other overheads, lower information and 
monitoring costs and the like. Information, for example, can be reused and thereby 
avoid cost duplication, facilitate creativity in developing solutions to client needs, and 
                                                            
10 A. N. Berger and D. B. Humphrey op cit 1. 
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leverage client-specific knowledge.  
On the other hand, cost diseconomies of scope may arise from such factors as 
the inertia and lack of responsiveness and creativity that may come with increased firm 
breadth, complexity and bureaucratization, as well as “turf” and profit-attribution conflicts 
that increase costs or erode product quality, or serious cultural differences between 
organizational “silos” that inhibit seamless delivery of a broad range of financial 
services.  
Like economies of scale, cost-related scope economies should be directly 
observable in costs of financial services suppliers and in aggregate performance 
measures. But most empirical studies have failed to find significant cost-economies of 
scope in the banking, insurance or securities industries.11 They do suggest that some 
cost-diseconomies of scope are encountered when firms in the financial services sector 
add new product-ranges to their portfolios, finding that unit-costs seem to go up 
(although not dramatically) as product ranges widen. However, given the period covered 
by many of these studies, they tend to involve firms that were shifting away from a pure 
focus on banking or insurance, and that may therefore have incurred considerable front-
end costs in expanding their activity range. Assuming these outlays affected firms” 
accounting statements during the sample period, one might expect to see this evidence 
of diseconomies of scope reversed in future periods.  
Revenue Economies of Scope  
On the revenue side, economies of scope attributable to cross-selling arise when 
the all-in cost to the buyer of multiple financial services from a single supplier is less 
than the cost of purchasing them from separate suppliers. This includes the cost of the 
services themselves plus information, search, monitoring, contracting and other costs. 
Firms that have diversified into several types of activities or geographic areas also tend 
to have more contact points with clients. As with the cost side, revenue diseconomies of 
scope could also arise from the management complexities and conflicts associated with 
greater breadth. 
Historical studies have yielded some evidence on revenue economies of scope. 
Some studies have found that US bank affiliates typically underwrote better performing 
securities than specialized investment banks during the 1920s, when US commercial 
banks were permitted to have securities affiliates. Perhaps commercial banks obtained 
knowledge about firms contemplating selling securities through the deposit and 
borrowing history of the firm, which would enable them to select the best risks to bring 
to market. Other research has found that securities underwritten by commercial banks 
generated higher prices than similar securities underwritten by investment banks, which 
suggests the former carry lower ex ante risks. [Puri, 1994] 
Most empirical studies of cross-selling are based on survey data, and are difficult 
                                                            
11 G. DeLong, Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank mergers, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 59, 221-252 (2001); G. DeLong, Focusing versus diversifying bank mergers: Analysis of 
market reaction and long-term performance, Working Paper, CUNY (2001). 
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to generalize.12 Regarding wholesale commercial and investment banking services, for 
example, one issue is whether companies are more likely to award M&A work to banks 
that are also willing lenders, or whether the two services are separable – so that 
companies go to the firms with the perceived best M&A capabilities (probably 
independent investment banking houses or boutiques) for advice and to others 
(presumably the major commercial banks) for loans. This is sometimes called “mixed 
bundling,” meaning that the price of one service (e.g., commercial lending) is dependent 
on the client also taking another service (e.g., M&A advice or securities underwriting). 
The search for immediate scope-driven revenue gains have led to some disastrous 
lending by commercial banks in the energy and telecoms sectors in recent years.  
It is at the retail level that most revenue economies of scope are likely to 
materialize, since the search and contracting costs of retail customers are likely to be 
higher than those of corporate customers. The Glass-Steagall restraints in place until 
1999 mean that there is only limited US evidence on retail cross-selling, and evidence 
from Europe (where universal banking has always been part of the landscape) is mainly 
case-based and suggests highly variable outcomes as to the efficacy of bancassurance 
or Allfinanz.  
In any case, the future may see some very different retail business models, with 
clients taking advantage of user-friendly software interfaces to access Webservice 
platforms which allow real-time linkages to multiple financial services vendors. In effect, 
this will amount to “cross-purchasing” rather than “cross-selling”, and give the client both 
the “feel” of single-source purchasing with access to best-in-class vendors. Apart from 
the continuous need for financial advice, such a business model could reduce 
information, transaction and contracting costs, while at the same time providing client-
driven open-architecture access to the universe of competing vendors. Advice could be 
built into the model, either by suppliers incorporating an advisory function into their 
downlinks, or through independent financial advisers. If such models of retail financial 
services delivery take hold in the market in the future, some of the rationale for cross-
selling and revenue economies of scope could become obsolete. 
Despite an almost total lack of hard empirical evidence, revenue economies of 
scope may indeed exist at both the wholesale and retail level, but they are likely to be 
very specific to the types of services provided and the types of clients served. So 
revenue-related scope economies are clearly linked to a firm’s specific strategic 
positioning across clients, products and geographies, as depicted in Figure 2. What little 
empirical evidence there is suggests that revenue-economies of scope seem to exist for 
specific combinations of products in the realm of commercial and investment banking, 
as well as insurance and asset management.13 But the proprietary nature of relevant in-
company data has meant that no empirical studies have so far been available to confirm 
or refute the existence of revenue economies of scale at the individual product level. 
                                                            
12 G. DeLong, ibid.; J. Houston, C. James and M. Ryngaert, Where do merger gains come from? Bank mergers from 
the perspective of insiders and outsiders, Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 285‐331 (2001). 
13 K. Mitchell and N. Onvural, Economies of scale and scope at large commercial banks, Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, 28, 178-199 (1996). 
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Even if cross-selling potential exists, the devil is in the detail – mainly in the 
design of incentives and organizational structures to ensure that it actually occurs. 
These incentives have to be extremely granular and compatible with employee real-
world behavior, or no amount of management pressure and exhortation to cross-sell is 
likely to succeed. Moreover, it seems likely that (given imperfect information) the 
broader a financial firm’s activity-range (1) the greater will be the probability that it will 
encounter potential conflicts of interest, (2) the higher will be the potential agency costs 
facing clients, and (3) the more difficult and costly will be the internal and external 
safeguards necessary to prevent the exploitation of such conflicts of interest. If this is 
so, the competitive consequences associated with conflict-exploitation could offset the 
realization of economies of scope in financial services firms. The adverse legal, 
regulatory and reputational consequences of the exploitation such conflicts– along with 
the managerial and operational costs of complexity – point to the potential role of 
diseconomies of scope.  
Market Concentration and Leadership 
In addition to the strategic search for improved operating economies and revenue 
synergies, financial services firms will also seek to dominate markets in order to extract 
economic returns. This is often referred to economies of “size”, as opposed to classic 
economies of “scale,” and can convey distinct competitive advantages that are reflected 
in either business volume or margins, or both. Many national markets for financial 
services have shown a distinct tendency towards oligopoly, with market power allowing 
banks to charge more (monopoly benefits) or pay less (monopsony benefits). 
Supporters argue that high levels of market concentration are necessary in order to 
provide a viable competitive platform, while opponents argue that, without convincing 
evidence of scale economies or other size-related efficiency gains, monopolistic market 
structures serve mainly to extract rents from end-users of financial services and 
redistribute them to shareholders - or to cross-subsidize other areas of activity, invest in 
wasteful projects or reduce pressures for cost-containment. 
Indeed, it is a puzzle why managers of financial services firms often seem to 
believe that the end-game in their industry’s competitive structure is the emergence of a 
few firms in a competitive environment with high sustainable margins - for example US 
financial intermediation comprising 4 or 5 conglomerates with a combined market share 
of 60 or 70 percent. In the the real world, or course, such an outcome can easily trigger 
antitrust action leading to breaks-ups and spin-offs in order to restore more vigorous 
competition. Particularly in a critical – and thus highly politicized - economic sector such 
as financial services, a regulatory response to “excessive” concentration is a virtual 
certainty, despite the often furious lobbying in favor of greater concentration. In Canada, 
for example, regulators prevented two mega-mergers in late 1998 that would have 
reduced the number of major financial firms (all of them universal banks) from five to 
three, with a retail market share of about 90% between them. Regulators blocked the 
deals despite management arguments that US financial services firms operating in 
Canada under North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) rules would provide the 
necessary competitive pressure to prevent the exploitation of monopoly power in the 
Canadian market.  
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Despite very substantial consolidation in recent years (Exhibit 4) within that is 
perhaps the most globally concentrated financial services industry sector - wholesale 
banking and capital markets activities - there is little evidence of excessive market 
power. Although some 80% of the combined value of global fixed-income and equity 
underwriting, loan syndications and M&A mandates is captured by the top-ten firms, the 
industry remains subject to ruthless competition in most of these business areas. Exhibit 
5 shows why, using data from the first half of 2009 – Herfindahl-Hirshman ratio of only 
about 1,200 (0<HHI<10,000) due to the evenness of market share distribution among 
the top firms. This intense competition has been reflected in the returns to investors in 
shares of the principal players. There is some evidence that despite all the consolidation 
activity in global wholesale banking there has been a long-term erosion of returns to 
capital invested in this sector, encouraging the firms to focus increasingly into 
proprietary trading and principal investing and their attendant risks. 
A similar situation exists in asset management, where the top firms comprise a 
mixture of European, American and Japanese fund managers, plus a variety of banks, 
broker-dealers, independent fund management companies and insurance companies. 
Although market definitions clearly have to be drawn more precisely, at least on a global 
level asset management seems to be among the most contested sectors in the financial 
industry, although it has shown very few signs of increasing concentration in recent 
years. 
In short, although monopoly power created through mergers and acquisitions in 
the financial services industry can produce market conditions that allow firms to 
reallocate gains from clients to themselves, such conditions are not easy to achieve or 
to sustain. New players – even relatively small entrants – can penetrate the market and 
destroy oligopolistic pricing structures, and end-users are willing to shop around among 
good substitutes available from other types of financial services firms. Even after 
extensive consolidation in global wholesale banking, vigorous competition seems to 
have been maintained in most cases.  
Proprietary Information and Imbedded Human Capital  
One argument in favor of large, diverse financial services firms is that internal 
information flows are substantially better - and involve lower costs - than the external 
information flows available to more narrowly focused firms. Consequently a firm that is 
present in a broad range of financial markets, functions and geographies can find 
proprietary and client-driven trading and structuring opportunities that smaller and 
narrower firms cannot.  
A second argument has to do with technical know-how. Significant areas of 
financial services – particularly wholesale banking and asset management – have 
become the realm of highly specialized expertise, which can be reflected in both market 
share and price effects. As noted, large numbers of financial boutiques have been 
acquired by major banks, insurance companies, securities firms and asset managers for 
precisely this purpose, and anecdotal evidence suggests that in many cases these 
acquisitions have been shareholder-value enhancing for the buyer.  
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Closely aligned to this is the human capital argument. Technical skills and 
entrepreneurial behavior are embodied in people, and people can (and do) move 
between firms. Parts of the financial services industry have become notorious for the 
mobility of talent, sometimes to the point of “free-agency,” with people or even teams of 
people regarding themselves as “firms within firms.” 
There are no empirical studies of these issues, although there is little question as 
to their importance. Many financial services are specialist businesses, conducted by 
specialists, to meet specialist client requirements. The know-how embodied in people is 
clearly mobile, and the key is to provide a platform that is sufficiently incentive 
compatible to make the most of it. But in terms of the wider arguments, it is unclear 
whether institutional size or breadth has much to do with this. 
Diversification, Financial Stability and Bankruptcy Risk 
Greater diversification of earnings attributable to multiple products, client-groups 
and geographies is often deemed to create more stable, safer, and ultimately more 
valuable financial institutions. The lower the correlations among the cash flows from the 
firm’s various activities, the greater the benefits of diversification. The consequences 
should include higher credit quality and higher debt ratings (due to lower bankruptcy 
risk), and therefore lower costs of financing than those faced by narrower, more focused 
firms, while greater earnings stability should bolster stock prices. In combination, these 
effects should reduce the cost of capital and enhance profitability.  
A number of empirical studies have attempted to assess the value of 
diversification in terms of earnings stability by back-testing the impact of hypothetical 
paired or clustered combinations of financial firms. What impact would the combination 
of various commercial banks, broker-dealers, insurers and asset management firms 
have had on earnings stability of the constituent firms, adjusting for the level of 
earnings? [Saunders and Walter, 1994]. The findings of such studies generally conclude 
that relatively low correlations among key financial businesses do indeed explain a 
positive stability-effect of firm scope.  
Conglomerate Discount 
It is often argued that, all else being equal, the shares of business conglomerates 
tend to trade at prices lower than shares of more narrowly-focused firms. There are two 
basic reasons why this “conglomerate discount” is alleged to exist. 
  First, it is argued that, on the whole, conglomerates tend to use capital 
inefficiently. This may be attributable to managerial discretion to engage in value-
reducing projects, cross-subsidization of marginal or loss-making projects that drain 
resources from healthy businesses, misalignments in incentives between central and 
divisional managers, etc. Most erosion of value in conglomerates is blamed on over-
investment in marginally profitable activities and cross-subsidization. If it is true that 
conglomerates’ internal capital markets function less efficiently than the external capital 
market, their shares ought to trade at a discount to the stand-alone value of their 
constituent businesses. [Berger and Ofek, 1995] 
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The empirical findings based on research across broad ranges of nonfinancial 
businesses may well also apply to the diverse activities carried out by financial firms. If 
retail and wholesale banking, and P&C insurance, are evolving into highly-specialized, 
performance-driven businesses, for example, one may ask whether the kinds of 
conglomerate discounts found in industrial firms may not also apply in the case of 
financial conglomerate structures - especially if centralized decision-making is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant to the requirements of the specific businesses.  
A second possible source of conglomerate discount is that investors in shares of 
conglomerates find it difficult to “take a view” and will want to avoid such stocks, 
preferring to add pure sectoral exposures in their efforts to construct efficient asset-
allocation profiles. This is especially true where performance-driven managers of 
institutional equity portfolios are under pressure to outperform cohorts or equity indexes 
– why would such a fund manager want to invest in yet another (closed-end) fund in the 
form of a financial conglomerate, which might be active in retail and wholesale 
commercial banking, in middle-market lending, private banking, corporate finance, 
trading, investment banking, asset management insurance and perhaps other 
businesses as well? 
Both the capital-misallocation and the portfolio-selection effects tend to weaken 
investors’ demand for shares of universal banks and financial conglomerates, thus 
lowering their equity prices and leading to a higher cost of capital. In turn, this will have 
a bearing on the competitive performance and profitability of these financial giants, 
perhaps enough to wholly or partially offset some of the aforementioned benefits of 
conglomeration such as greater stability and lower bankruptcy risk through 
diversification across business lines. 
Recent large-scale empirical studies have attempted to ascertain whether or not 
functional diversification in the financial services sector is value-enhancing or value-
destroying. One study [Schmid and Walter, 2009] based on a large U.S. dataset 
covering the period 1985-2004 found evidence of substantial and persistent 
conglomerate discounts among financial intermediaries, with the empirical results 
suggesting that it was diversification that caused the discounts, rather than the 
discounts resulting from troubled firms diversifying into other more promising areas. The 
study also investigated both the geographic dimension of diversification and the 
interaction between geographic scope and functional diversification, concluding that the 
value-destruction associated with functional diversification was not apparent with 
geographic diversification.  
These results were broadly in line with those of another study that found strong 
evidence of a conglomerate discount in a sample of 836 banks from 43 different 
countries. [Laeven and Levine, 2007]. This coincidence of empirical findings was 
remarkable in that the panel data used in the two investigations were quite different;  
one focused on diversification among banks and the other considered diversification 
along all forms of financial intermediation. 
Mispriced Financial Support – Government Bailouts and Financial Conglomerates 
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 The preceding discussion has focused on the industrial economics of financial 
intermediation – scale, scope, market structure, operating efficiency, information and 
transaction costs, diversification, conglomerate discount and other fundamental drivers 
of size and scope. Is bigger better? Is broader better? It all depends on the underlying 
economics of the financial intermediation business, and the balance could cut either 
way. And even a dispassionate conclusion may be overridden by managements and 
boards if there are serious agency problems causing their objectives to differ from those 
of shareholders.  
The gorilla in the room, however, is the prospect of government support under 
adverse circumstances – support that could totally distort the finely-honed 
microeconomics of financial intermediation. Financial services, as an industry, is 
arguably more likely to attract government support than any other. So it is no surprise 
that this contingent claim on the public purse may influence the behavior of equity and 
debt investors, clients and counterparties, depositors, managers and boards. If the 
taxpayer is going to hold a credible safety net, why not perform exciting, even death-
defying tricks far up on the high-wire? 
While there is almost never a formal government bailout commitment to financial 
intermediaries, financial services firms that surpass a given size threshold (or are 
otherwise judged to be “systemic”) will usually be bailed-out by taxpayers. Historically in 
the United States, this public support became explicit when the Comptroller of the 
Currency testified to Congress in the 1980s that 11 banks were so important that they 
would not be permitted to fail – bank bailouts were clearly undertaken in the savings 
and loan collapses during that decade in order to keep the rot from spreading to the 
financial system more broadly. The same policy tends to exist in other countries, and in 
most cases covers even more of the local financial system - there were numerous 
examples in France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Japan and most Asia-
Pacific countries during the1990s. Perhaps the most disastrous example of the power of 
implied guarantees is Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, privately-owned government-
sponsored enterprises whose AAA debt rating allowed them to expand their share of the 
US mortgage Market from 13% on 1982 to 52% in 2007. As Exhibit 6 shows, their 
collapse in the debt crisis wiped-out the equity investors but returned 100% to debt 
investors as the implicit guarantee became explicit and the GSEs came under 
government conservatorship, effectively doubling the national debt as it stood at the 
time. 
Bailouts, whether explicit or implicit, create a potentially important public subsidy 
for major financial firms – the mere prospect of a government rescue can lower their 
cost of capital and assure clients that they will be around. This in turn can help them 
gain market share and crowd-out less systemic competitors, using an unpriced resource 
that may swamp the basic economics of financial intermediation. The cycle is clear – 
systemic means implicit government subsidies, which in turn make beneficiary firms 
more systemic and encourages moral hazard.  
That such support can extend well beyond classic financial intermediaries even 
in cases where private-sector remedies are available was illustrated in the 1998 
collapse of Long-term Capital Management, Inc., brokered by the Federal Reserve 
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(despite the fact that a credible private restructuring offer was on the table from 
Berkshire Hathaway, Goldman Sachs and AIG) on the basis that the firm’s failure could 
cause unpredictable damage to the global financial system. A decade later, the same 
argument was made by JP Morgan about the global copper market and one of its then-
dominant traders, Sumitomo, when the bank suggested that the 1996 collapse of the 
world copper market could have serious systemic effects, given major banks’ exposures 
in highly complex structured credits to the copper industry. A few years later, there were 
discussions about the systemic effects of the collapse of Enron in 2001, WorldCom in 
2002 and others.  
Much of the time such arguments are self-serving nonsense, but in the political 
environment during crisis conditions, TBTF guarantees can help throw a safety net 
broad enough to limit damage to shareholders and unsecured creditors of exposed 
banks and other financial firms, or sponsor mergers or other rescues that leave them in 
far better shape than in bankruptcy or liquidation (and paradoxically create even more 
systemic financial firms in the process). Central to the whole issue is the problem of 
moral hazard, since the prospect of bailouts can be thought of giving large and 
interconnected financial intermediaries the incentive to increase the risk of their 
operations in the chase for higher equity returns. Without state assurances, uninsured 
depositors and other liability holders demand a risk premium, but for a firm that will not 
be allowed to fail, this premium is no longer necessary. If the safety net is there and 
shareholders or unsecured creditors expect not to fall through the mesh, why worry? 
It is generally accepted that the larger the bank, the more likely it is to benefit 
from a safety net in times of crisis. Indeed, one empirical study found a significant 
valuation premium in the very largest of its sample financial firms (those with total 
assets above $100 billion), possibly indicating the impact of implicit systemic 
guarantees covering very large financial conglomerates. [Schmid and Walter, 2009]  
The same is true of a smaller financial firm (Bear Stearns in the most recent crisis, for 
example) that is so interconnected with the global network of financial flows that its 
failure could bring down the whole network. Surely the massive and necessary bailouts 
during the 2007-09 financial crisis, covering a broad array of institutions, instruments 
and markets (see Exhibit 7) distorts the US financial architecture, now and in the future, 
through support actions sufficient to override many of the underlying economic drivers 
of the financial sector’s structure, conduct and performance. 
 
4. Benchmarking the Regulatory Options 
As a general proposition, financial intermediaries cannot be allowed to impose 
politically unacceptable costs on society, either by failing individuals deemed worthy of 
protection in financial matters or by permitting firm-level failure to contaminate other 
financial institutions and, ultimately, the system as a whole. Protecting the system from 
misconduct and instability is in the public interest, and inevitably presents policymakers 
with difficult choices between financial efficiency and innovation on the one hand, and 
institutional and systemic safety and stability on the other, together with the assuring 
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integrity and sound business conduct in financial dealings. And because the services 
provided by banks and other financial intermediaries as allocators of capital affect 
nearly everything else in the economy, regulatory failure quickly becomes a traumatic 
event with important consequences for the real sector. 
The complexity of the financial services industry as a whole and individual 
financial intermediaries themselves has important and unique implications for the nature 
and effectiveness of regulation. Markets and institutions tend, perhaps more often than 
not, to run ahead of the regulators. Regulatory initiatives sometimes have 
consequences that were not and perhaps could not have been foreseen, as discussed 
in Section 2 of this paper.  
The regulatory dialectic in the financial services sector is both sophisticated and 
complex, and it often confronts heavily entrenched and politically well-connected 
players (and runs up against the personal financial interests of some of the brightest 
minds and biggest egos in business). The more complex the industry, the greater the 
challenge to sensible regulation, probably nowhere as strikingly as in the case of 
massive, complex, global financial services conglomerates that may be too hard to 
manage, too hard to oversee and govern,and almost certainly too hard to monitor and 
regulate.  
The Trade-offs 
In terms of their mandate from the public, regulators must strive to achieve 
maximum static and dynamic efficiency of the financial system as a whole. That is, they 
need to ensure both efficiency in financial flows and innovation in financial products and 
processes, and they need to promote the competitive viability of financial institutions 
that are subject to regulation. Simultaneously, they must safeguard the (micro-
prudential) stability of key institutions and the (macro-prudential) stability of the financial 
system as a whole. In addition, they need to ensure what is considered “acceptable” 
market conduct in order to retain confidence in financial integrity, including the politically 
sensitive implied social contract between financial institutions and unsophisticated 
clients (consumer protection). 
We have noted that the problem of safety-net design is beset with difficulties 
such as moral hazard and adverse selection. This becomes especially problematic 
when products and activities shade into one another, when on-and off-balance sheet 
activities are involved, and when domestic, foreign and offshore business is conducted 
by financial firms for which the regulator is responsible. The problem of market conduct 
is no less difficult, when end- users of the system range across a broad spectrum of 
financial sophistication from mass-market retail clients to highly sophisticated, 
interprofessional trading counterparties. All the while, the system has to be sufficiently 
robust to avoid arbitrage across geographic or functional jurisdictions by firms that can 
afford the best legal minds and lobbyists that money can buy.  
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In short, regulation in the public interest has as its objective the maintenance of a 
financial system that is safe, sound and equitable - one that is resistant to collapse and 
avoids contamination of the payments system and credit allocation (and therefore the 
real economy), is hard to “game,” and provides a level playing field for participants 
without precluding the failure of institutions that are not competitively viable or are 
poorly managed. A tall order indeed. 
More broadly, the regulatory function in finance remains almost entirely a matter 
of national sovereignty. Yet banks and other financial firms can and do operate across 
national jurisdictions, and in offshore markets that can help them avoid significant parts 
of the regulatory net altogether. Regulatory burdens deemed excessive in one country 
can trigger migration of financial value-added that can significantly shift the gains from 
one financial center to another, encouraging regulatory laxity. With safety nets and 
regulation almost entirely a matter of national sovereignty, who is responsible. For 
example, should firms that operate across national borders be broken-up into networks 
of national intermediaries so that those who carry the safely net get to do the 
regulating? What would be gained? What would be lost? 
In a highly competitive industry with multiple functional and geographic 
regulators, is this a race to the bottom? Probably not.  
One can think about financial regulation and supervision as imposing a set of 
“taxes” and “subsidies” on the operations of financial firms exposed to them. [Kane, 
1987, 2001] On the one hand, the imposition of reserve requirements, capital adequacy 
rules, liquidity requirements, financial disclosure rules, limits on off-balance sheet 
transactions and the like can be viewed as imposing “taxes” on a financial firm’s 
activities, in the sense that they increase intermediation costs. On the other hand, 
regulator-supplied deposit insurance, information production and dissemination, and 
lender of last resort facilities serve to stabilize financial markets, reduce information and 
transaction inefficiencies, improve liquidity, and lower the risk of systemic failure, 
thereby supporting the process of financial intermediation. Such functions by regulators 
can be viewed as implicit “subsidies” ultimately provided by taxpayers. 
The difference between these “tax” and “subsidy” elements of regulation and 
public support can be viewed as the “net regulatory burden” (NRB) faced by particular 
types of financial firms in any given jurisdiction. All else equal, financial flows tend to 
migrate toward those regulatory domains where the NRB is lowest. NRB differences 
can induce financial-intermediation shifts across markets and geographies when the 
savings realized exceed the transaction, communication, information, and other 
economic costs of shifting.  
It has been argued that a significant driver of global financial disintermediation 
and the involvement by various types of financial firms, discussed in Section 3, has 
been due to differences in NRB. As financial firms continuously seek to reduce NRB 
and can do so at acceptable cost, they will actively seek product innovations or 
transaction venues that will help achieve this objective. Only two years before the onset 
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of the 2007-09 global financial crisis, two major reports – one commissioned by then 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson [Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2006] 
and the other commissioned by McKinsey for officials of the City and State of New York 
[McKinsey, 2007]  – argued for significant US deregulation to avoid losing large parts of 
wholesale financial intermediation to London and other financial centers based on 
evidence (much of it seriously flawed) that this migration was already well underway. 
The “elegant whining” that permeated both reports was somewhat mistimed, coming as 
it did only months before the roof fell in on the US system, in part attributable to 
regulatory failures.  
In going about their business, regulators continuously face the possibility that 
“inadequate” regulation will result in costly failures and, alternatively, that 
“overregulation” will create opportunity costs in the form of financial efficiencies or 
innovations not achieved, or in the relocation of firms and financial transactions to other 
regulatory regimes offering lower NRBs. Since any improvements in financial stability 
can only be measured in terms of damage that did not occur and costs that were 
successfully avoided, the argumentation surrounding financial regulation is invariably 
based on “what if” hypotheticals. In effect, regulators are constantly compelled to rethink 
the balance between financial efficiency and creativity on the one hand, and safety, 
stability, and suitable market conduct in the financial system on the other. They face the 
daunting task of designing an “optimum” regulatory and supervisory structure that 
provides the desired degree of stability at minimum cost to efficiency, innovation, and 
competitiveness - and to do so in a highly politicized environment in a way that 
effectively aligns such policies among regulatory authorities functionally and 
internationally and avoids “fault lines” across regulatory regimes. There are no easy 
answers. There are only “better” and “worse” solutions as perceived by the constituents 
to whom the regulators are ultimately accountable. 
Regulatory Performance Against Benchmarks 
US financial history shows how difficult it is to strike the right balance in financial 
regulation. In commercial banking alone, that history records well over 15,000 failures 
between 1900 and today - 5,000 just during the Great Depression of the 1930s and an 
annual average of well over 100 some fifty years later during the 1980s (not including 
massive failures of thrift institutions and the $150 billion taxpayer bailout in the Savings 
& Loan debacle). Mismanagement or outright fraud have left prominent names like 
Banco Ambrosiano, BCCI, Bank Bumiputra, Crédit Lyonnais, Barings, Franklin National 
Bank, Herstatt, Schroder Münchmeyer Hengst, Seafirst, and Continental Illinois among 
the failed or seriously damaged over the years, plus essentially the entire Japanese 
banking system and those of Finland, Mexico, Norway, and Sweden in the early 1990s,. 
The Asian crisis of the late 1990s led to major financial failures in Indonesia, Korea, and 
Thailand.  
The financial crisis that began in 2007 was basically a continuation of this long 
history of regulatory failure, complete with numerous examples leading up to the crisis 
of regulatory arbitrage (both functional and geographic), regulatory forbearance and the 
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political capture of regulators by the institutions they were supposed to regulate - with 
enormous costs to the financial system and the economy as financial instability 
contaminated the real sector.  
Most of the regulators on the bridge when the ship hit the iceberg have 
acknowledged the policy shortcomings that contributed to the disaster, in sharp contrast 
to the senior managements and boards of the institutions directly involved. Perhaps the 
most respected and experienced observer of the US financial system, former Federal 
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, noted in a speech in April 2008 that “… today’s 
financial crisis is the culmination, as I count them, of at least five serious breakdowns of 
systemic significance in the past 25 years – on the average one every five years. 
Warning enough that something rather basic is amiss…. Simply stated, the bright new 
financial system - for all its talented participants, for all its rich rewards – has failed the 
test of the market place… [A] demonstrably fragile financial system that has produced 
unimaginable wealth for some, while repeatedly risking a cascading breakdown of the 
system as a whole, needs repair and reform.”14  
Volcker is clearly on-target in terms of financial instability and its costs to society, 
but even he cannot document the counterfactual: How would the world have turned out 
- in terms of economic growth and other things people care about - if a bulletproof 
regulatory system had prevailed for the preceding half century, effectively impeding 
most of the efficiency and innovation that ultimately contributed to the instability? Would 
society have been better off? Volcker would surely concede this point, but probably 
steadfastly maintain that we can do much better going forward. 
 
5. Conclusions: Should Financial Conglomerates be Broken-up? 
 Section 2 of this paper provided an account of the forced breakup of US 
universal banks in the financial and economic crisis of 1933, coinciding with the transfer 
of power to the new administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. There was little time or 
sympathy for special pleading, influence peddling or legal challenges. The new 
president was preoccupied with an economic disaster and had little compassion for the 
banks as his administration turned to a mixed bag of measured to try to break the cycle 
of economic collapse. The contentious Pecora Hearings, leading up to the Banking Act 
of 1933, had put the big US universal banks on the defensive and limited their political 
influence on the rules of the game. It proved to be a window of opportunity in which the 
public interest as then perceived was clearly paramount, and Congress did what it felt it 
had to do, for better or worse. As discussed, the result had a profound impact on the 
structure of US and global finance for well over half a century. 
 Emergence from the latest crisis provides a window of opportunity to once again 
change the rules in the direction the public interest, although it is closing fast. Most 
                                                            
14 Paul A. Volcker, remarks at a meeting of the Economic Club of New York, 28 April 2008, transcript at 
http://econclubny.org/files/Transcript_Volcker_April_2008.pdf 
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legislative hearings on the issues have been pale imitations of the 1933 Pecora 
Hearings, often involving political grandstanding and photo-ops for the political by the 
people’s representatives – themselves major recipients of political contributions from the 
financial services executives testifying before them. In the background, their “seventh 
line of business” lobbying shops were in overdrive to maintain public subsidies awarded 
during the height of the crisis and preempt regulatory change deemed against their 
interests.  
The chemistry of special interest politics of financial reform has been likened to 
the kind of third-world “crony capitalism” the US has consistently lectured others about - 
which assures a green light for financial institutions to go back to business as usual as 
quickly as possible even as they continue to benefit from taxpayer subsidies. [Johnson, 
2009] Defeatists have argued that it will take an even more devastating crisis, one that 
engulfs politics (notably campaign finance reform) as well as finance and economics, to 
trigger a Pecora-like process and lead to meaningful reforms. 
Calibrating the Options 
From the perspective of the public interest alone, Section 3 of this paper has 
suggested four key benchmarks against which financial systems should be calibrated. 
These can be summarized as follows: 
1. Static efficiency. The metrics include the weighted mean spread between what 
ultimate savers (predominantly households) receive and what ultimate users of capital 
(households, nonfinancial businesses and governments) have to pay. That spread is 
heavily influenced by some composite of operating costs, regulatory costs, and 
intermediation losses. 
2. Dynamic efficiency. Here the metrics are less transparent, and include product and 
process innovation and technology change in financial intermediation and the role of the 
financial system in promoting economic growth by continually allocating and denying 
capital to competing uses in the production function that drives the real economy.  
3. Stability. The financial system itself should be sufficiently robust to withstand shocks 
that will inevitably emanate from the real sector from time to time, and the financial 
sector should be resistant producing shocks of its own, which inevitably spill over into 
the real sector of the economy. 
4. Competitiveness. In a macro sense, the financial sector is an industry like any other, 
and generates income, employment and international trade in services. Countries 
compete vigorously to maintain financial centers that add value in this regard. New York 
and London are the dominant global wholesale hubs, arch-rivals and constantly under 
competitive pressure from insurgent financial centers, particularly as the contours of 
financial flows shift geographically. Key metrics include share of new debt and equity 
issues, secondary market trading volumes, exchange-traded and OTC derivatives 
volumes, assets under management, and M&A deals advised. 
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As outlined in Section 4 of this paper, these benchmarks may well conflict with 
each other and involve tradeoffs that are often hard to identify and measure. 
Nevertheless, options for financial reform - and particularly line-of-business or 
geographic constraints - that are in the public interest should be calibrated largely 
against these benchmarks. The results can usually be assessed only after some time 
has passed. And even then, they are invariably controversial based on counterfactuals 
that will be put forward.  
Evaluating the Alternatives 
There are at least four alternatives for regulating the scope of business of financial 
intermediaries going forward. 
1. Modified laissez faire. The first option is essentially maintaining the status quo 
(the Gramm-Leach-Bliley rules in the US and universal banking rules in other countries), 
and allowing banks or bank holding companies to engage in all forms of financial 
intermediation and principal investing worldwide, subject to certain firewalls and other 
safeguards. These safeguards would be duly modified to deal with systemic risk and 
incorporate the lessons of the financial crisis of 2007-09. This option is already in train 
in the US, and major regulators elsewhere have recommitted themselves to the 
universal banking or financial conglomerate model, i.e., that bigger and broader are 
better. 
In June 2009 the Obama administration proposed a laundry-list of financial reforms 
that will be subject to debate for some time to come, most of them eminently sensible 
but vulnerable to being dissected and defanged in the political-regulatory process. 
[Department of the Treasury, 2009] Organizationally, there is a Financial Services 
Oversight Council in the White House, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and 
comprising the seven key financial regulators. Since the plan contains no major 
changes in the regulatory structure except a new consumer finance agency, a key role 
of the Council will be to deal with the inevitable turf battles and regulatory arbitrage that 
is bound to persist.  
The plan foresees the identification of systemic financial intermediaries – so-called 
“Tier 1 financial holding companies (FHCs).” Criteria for classification as a Tier 1 firm 
include the impact a firm’s failure would have on the financial system and the economy; 
the firm’s combination of size, leverage (including off-balance sheet exposures), and 
degree of reliance on short-term funding; and the firm’s criticality as a source of credit 
for households, businesses, and state and local governments and as a source of 
liquidity for the financial system, especially under stressed economic conditions. A 
systemic risk regulator is foreseen that has sufficient discretion to reach beyond 
financial holding companies in order to adapt to inevitable innovations in financial 
activity and in the organizational structure of financial firms, and to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage.  
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Damaged Tier 1 FHCs will be subject to prompt corrective action (PCA) based on a 
decline in their capital ratios below regulatory minimums, effectively extending the 
mostly successful experience of the FDIC as provided in the 1991 Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act. Each Tier 1 financial holding company will 
have to maintain an actionable plan to wind-down the firm in case of severe financial 
distress, orderly resolution that was sorely missed during the crisis 
Tier 1 financial firms will be subject to more exacting prudential supervision and 
more stringent capital and liquidity standards than non-systemic firms. The plan also 
refers to more stringent “activity standards.” Two sections of the Treasury plan cover 
this issue [US Treasury, 2009] as follows: 
 
A. Tier 1 FHCs that do not control insured depository institutions should be subject 
to the full range of prudential regulations and supervisory guidance applicable to 
bank holding companies (BHCs). In addition, the long-standing wall between 
banking and commerce – which has served our economy well – should be extended 
to apply to this new class of financial firm. Accordingly, each Tier 1 FHC also should 
be required to comply with the nonfinancial activity restrictions of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956, regardless of whether it controls an insured depository 
institution….A Tier 1 FHC that has not been previously subject to the [Bank Holding 
Company Act] should be given five years to conform to the existing activity 
restrictions imposed on FHCs by the BHC Act. 
 
B. [Provisions in the] Federal Reserve Act are designed to protect a depository 
institution from suffering losses in its transactions with affiliates. These provisions 
also limit the ability of a depository institution to transfer to its affiliates the subsidy 
arising from the institution’s access to the federal safety net, which includes FDIC 
deposit insurance, access to Federal Reserve liquidity, and access to Federal 
Reserve payment systems….The recent financial crisis has highlighted, more clearly 
than ever, the value of the federal subsidy associated with the banking charter, as 
well as the related value to a consolidated financial firm of owning a bank. Although 
the existing set of firewalls…are strong, the framework can and should be 
strengthened further. Specifically, we propose that regulators should place more 
effective constraints on the ability of banks to engage in over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives and securities financing transactions with affiliates [and] covered 
transactions between banks and their affiliates should be required to be fully 
collateralized throughout the life of the transactions. Moreover, the existing federal 
restrictions on transactions between banks and affiliates should be applied to 
transactions between a bank and all private investment vehicles sponsored or 
advised by the bank. The Federal Reserve’s discretion to provide exemptions from 
the bank/affiliate firewalls also should be limited….Finally, the Federal Reserve and 
the federal banking agencies should tighten the supervision and regulation of 
potential conflicts of interest generated by the affiliation of banks and other financial 
firms, such as proprietary trading units and hedge funds. 
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The key dimensions of the Obama plan that could affect the structure of financial 
intermediaries thus involve (a) mandating a systemic risk regulator, (b) “pricing” implicit 
public subsidies to systemic financial firms using capital and liquidity requirements, and 
(c) limiting the engagement of systemic financial firms in certain financial activities. 
Whereas the 1930s US reforms were truly revolutionary and in many ways visionary, 
the government’s 2009 reforms are cautious and incremental, mainly patching holes in 
a failed system and establishing early-warning and corrective action which hopefully will 
catch the next big crisis in time to prevent system-wide damage. 
Will they succeed? Much depends on how well the new systemic risk regulator – 
presumably the Federal Reserve – is able to do its job. Is it really likely that systemic 
institutions that have shown themselves to be too big and complex to manage and too 
big, complex and interconnected to regulate by the existing regulatory structure will be 
rendered failsafe under the evolutionary new regime. The ease with which the 
investment banking industry was able to increase leverage ratios in 2004, or the 
commercial banking industry in 2009 was able to undermine hard-fought progress on 
fair value accounting and permit bank manipulate earnings does not augur well for 
future regulatory capture. Certainly much talent in the years ahead will be devoted to 
avoidance, evasion, obfuscation and financial innovation with little or no commercial 
purpose. 
Critics of the Federal Reserve as the lead regulator of systemic financial firms argue 
that its track record in the run-up to the most recent crisis proved to be very poor indeed 
– but not necessarily worse than the combined efforts of the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority in the UK, or the European Central Bank and the gaggle of 
national regulators in continental Europe. Excessive pessimism is certainly premature, 
but the Fed’s increased politicization is a virtual certainty going forward, as its mandate 
extends further from monetary policy into politically sensitive macroprudential and 
microprudential domains. Together with the Treasury, it’s damage control efforts in the 
crisis broke all precedents. Will this become the norm? Certainly any hijacking of 
monetary policy to serve these new mandates is hardly likely to be in the public interest. 
On the other hand, pricing systemic risk using a combination of capital and liquidity 
requirements and the cost of more intense regulatory supervision has considerable 
promise. Effectively, these are “taxes” intended to internalize the negative externalities 
created by firms that produce systemic risk. Like pollution control, this previously 
unpriced or underpriced resource will henceforth be priced, and (assuming they cannot 
successfully undermine the policy) systemic financial firms will then have the 
opportunity to react. If boards and managements are doing their jobs, they will carefully 
reexamine the costs and benefits of remaining a massive financial conglomerate, for 
example, and find ways of escaping the newly imposed taxes - which will have to be 
agreed globally to prevent regulatory arbitrage.  
Skeptics, of course, will point to demonstrated weaknesses among financial 
institutions’ boards (including extreme complexity that prevents boards to know what 
they need to know), the virtual absence of hostile takeovers in financial services (i.e., 
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the absence of a well functioning market for corporate control in the financial sector), 
and the willingness of boards to live with the large discounts that seem to characterize 
financial conglomerates. With improved corporate governance and successful 
resistance to regulatory capture through a money-driven political process, the Obama 
approach may trigger much needed restructuring carried out by the firms themselves, 
including breakup of financial conglomerates, a larger cohort of nonsystemic and easier-
to regulate specialist firms, and shifting to investors the opportunity to create more 
efficient portfolios of exposures to equity and debt investments in financial 
intermediaries. 
2. Geographic Fragmentation – Even supporters of the Obama approach are concerned 
with global coordination and avoidance of competitive distortions, impeding globalization 
of finance that has contributed significantly to world economic growth. Observers point 
to the fact that national governments such as the UK, Switzerland, Japan, France and 
the US ultimately support the safety net covering financial conglomerates and other 
systemic firms based in their jurisdictions. In the case of large international firms based 
in small countries, the spillover from systemic risk of institutional failure to sovereign risk 
is obvious. Such countries therefore have an additional incentive to apply serious safety 
and soundness policies on their financial firms, as in the Obama plan, and then let the 
firms decide whether they should change their business models to avoid the costs. This 
incentive also suggests that most of the world’s home-countries of systemic financial 
firms would have a great incentive for the kind of international regulatory harmonization 
and coordination needed to make it work. 
 Skeptics argue that most countries are so wedded to the universal banking - 
financial conglomerates model that they are unlikely to go along with the tougher 
regulatory architecture that may result. Moreover, the length of time it took to achieve 
the Basle accords on capital adequacy (which turned out to be necessary but not 
sufficient under stress) does not augur well for effective globally coordinated regulatory 
reforms before the next crisis appears. An alternative that has been proposed is to force 
global systemic institutions to run their non-domestic operations as separately 
incorporated subsidiaries of the parent firm and regulated principally by the host 
countries. Host regulators, it is argued, are closer to the action and ultimately would 
have to carry the safety net, in effect ring-fencing local operations from support 
obligations on the part of home countries. Understandably, this argument has been 
received most enthusiastically in small countries home to big global financial firms. 
 There are of course telling counter-arguments. [Ackermann, 2009] The 
consequences for market-based global allocation of capital and risk would likely be 
debilitating, and new mechanisms would have to be found to preserve as much 
efficiency and innovation as possible in cross-border financial flows. Like protectionism 
in international trade, the costs of financial fragmentation could be enormous, although 
these costs are often broadly dispersed and hard to measure. On the positive side, the 
threat of financial fragmentation has provided a fear factor among politically powerful 
systemic firms, possibly undermining their resistance to other, less damaging regulatory 
options.  
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3. Reinstate a Modified Version of Glass-Steagall – The argument is that key activities 
of investment banks are incompatible with the special character of commercial banking, 
namely operating the payments system, taking deposits and making commercial loans, 
and serving as the transmission belt for monetary policy. These activities include 
underwriting and dealing in corporate debt and equities, asset-backed debt and certain 
other securities, derivatives of such securities including credit default swaps, principal 
investing and managing in-house hedge funds. These activities are also demed 
incompatible with access to Federal Reserve discount facilities, debt guarantees and 
other sources of government support intended to safeguard the public utility attributes of 
commercial banking.  
Under this option, the legacy investment banks that converted to bank holding 
companies in the crisis to gain full access to the government safety net (Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley) would revert to broker-dealer status and would be 
functionally regulated as such alongside oversight by a systemic risk regulator. The 
investment banking divisions of commercial banks would be sold, floated or spun-off to 
shareholders, and similarly regulated. Investment banking divisions of foreign financial 
conglomerates would have to be similarly divested or operate in the US as separately 
capitalized subsidiaries. 
The discussion in Section 2 of this paper has suggested that the Glass-Steagall 
constraints of 1933 may in fact have performed relatively well - when benchmarked 
against all four of the foregoing criteria - for over half a century. The epic battle between 
bank-based and capital-market based finance, domestically and internationally, assured 
static and dynamic efficiency pressure on all financial intermediaries, the system 
maintained basic stability in the face of major macro shocks and changing monetary 
standards. During this period, New York became the leading global center of finance, 
with London (benefiting from natural advantages such as time-zone overlaps and policy 
advantages such as light regulation and a thriving offshore market) as its only serious 
rival.  
All of the continental financial centers, dominated as they were by universal 
banks, dropped by the wayside as their own investment banking units joined their chief 
global wholesale rivals in London and New York. Meantime, investment banks 
gravitated to an integrated full-service model, complemented by boutiques, and thrived 
without access to central bank liquidity facilities or public bailouts in the case of failures 
like Barings in London or Peregrine Securities in Hong Kong. The same was true of 
buy-side specialists in the mutual fund business (e.g., Fidelity and Vanguard), pension 
funds (e.g., TIAA-CREF in the US and Hermes in the UK) and hedge funds (e.g., Soros 
and Tiger), although admittedly LTCM was a close call. Buy-side specialists help 
prevent the perennial problem of multiline firms trying to represent buyers and sellers 
simultaneously and the intractable conflicts of interest that result from them.  
 The survival and even prosperity of financial specialists in the presence of 
government supported and subsidized bank holding companies suggests that a modern 
version of Glass-Steagall would not be ruinous when benchmarked against the four 
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aforementioned criteria. M&A boutiques ranging from Perella Weinberg to Lazard 
Frères seem to be thriving on the basis of dispassionate corporate advice. So are mid-
size investment banks like Jeffries & Co., which do a viable mid-market business and 
make a point foregoing government support as against their conglomerate rivals. Almost 
certainly A.G. Edwards would have done likewise if it had not disappeared into the Bank 
of America conglomerate. In asset management and private equity, the dominant 
players like BlackRock, Vanguard, TPC and Carlyle have performed well against 
competing units of financial conglomerates, and in some cases have turned from clients 
to competitors in corporate finance. All of this is only anecdotal evidence, but it suggests 
that a powerful non-bank financial intermediation industry would quickly emerge 
following Glass-Steagall type re-regulation, one populated by relatively transparent firms 
that lend themselves to relatively straightforward oversight by functional regulators in 
tandem with a systemic risk regulator. 
3. Functional carve-outs and size constraints. A less draconian approach to 
reinstatement of activity separation along the lines of Glass-Steagall involves 
recognition that some types of financial activities should not be allowed within  
multifunctional financial firms deemed to be systemic and having powerful public utility 
characteristics. Among these activities are: 
 Management of in-house hedge funds. 
 Creating off balance sheet affiliates having no commercial purpose. 
 Running large proprietary trading positions in cash securities and derivatives.  
 Acting as principal investors in nonfinancial activities such as real estate and 
private equity. 
Financial conglomerates will argue that such carve-outs will limit synergies that are 
essential to their business models, despite general lack of evidence that such synergies 
actually exist, as discussed in Section 3 of this paper. Indeed, it is likely that a host of 
nonbank financial firms will step up to conduct those activities that contribute static or 
dynamic gains without risking systemic consequences as long as they appropriately 
regulated along functional lines with systemic risk oversight. 
 An alternative to carve-outs is to limit the size of financial conglomerates that 
incorporate commercial banking units, so that they are forced to become non-systemic. 
Metrics to achieve this could include market share caps, deposit or asset ceilings, and 
the like. This would not involve activity prohibitions, but size-constrained financial 
conglomerates would soon lose critical mass in specific areas of engagement, and 
presumably would try to focus on the most profitable ones and divest others. This could 
be a more market-aligned and elegant solution than specific activity carve-outs. Given 
murky evidence on the relationships between firm size and efficiency, stability and 
competitiveness, size constraints may have some merit. Paradoxically, or course, the 
general response of policymakers to the crisis (except for Lehman Brothers) is to make 
financial Goliaths even bigger and even more systemic. 
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All things considered the most defensible approach given the facts on the ground – 
and assuming it can be carried out in a disciplined, consistent, internationally 
coordinated and sustained manner with a firm eye to the public interest - is the first of 
these alternatives. By creating a shadow price for systemic risk universal banks and 
financial conglomerates will draw their own strategic conclusions in the context of the 
microeconomics and industrial organization of global wholesale financial intermediation. 
But these are big assumptions. Those who have become incurably cynical about politics 
and regulatory capture might think about advocating specific activity carve-outs as a 
second best alternative. Either option stands a reasonable chance of preventing the 
next “big one,” which surely would force a hard-return to Glass-Steagall with few 
regrets.  
 
References 
Aachrya, Viral and Matthew Richardson (eds), 2009. Restoring financial stability. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Ackermann, Josef. 2009. Smaller banks will not make us safer. Financial Times, 30 
July, p. 9. -  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9aef3d00-7c6d-11de-a7bf-00144feabdc0.html 
Berger, Philip G., Ofek, Eli, 1995. Diversification’s effect on firm value. Journal of 
Financial Economics 37, 39-65. 
Bodnar, Gordan M., Tang, Charles, Weintrop, Joseph, 1999. Both sides of corporate 
diversification: The value impacts of geographic and industrial diversification. Working 
Paper, Johns Hopkins University.  
Campa, Jose M., Kedia, Simi, 2002. Explaining the diversification discount. Journal of 
Finance 57, 1731-1762. 
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, 2006. Interim report of the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation (The Paulson Report). Washington, D.C.: US Government 
Printing Office. 
 
DeLong, Gayle, 2001a. Stockholder gains from focusing versus diversifying bank 
mergers. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 221-252. 
DeLong, Gayle, 2001b. Focusing versus diversifying bank mergers: Analysis of market 
reaction and long-term performance. Working Paper, CUNY. 
Denis, David J., Denis, Diane K., Yost, Keven, 2002. Global diversification, industrial 
diversification, and firm value. Journal of Finance 57, 1951-1979. 
33 
 
Fauver, Larry, Houston. Joel F., Naranjo, Andy, 2004. Cross-country evidence on the 
value of corporate industrial and international diversification. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 10, 729-752. 
Gande, Amar, Puri, Manju, Saunders, Anthony and Walter, Ingo, 1997. Bank 
underwriting of debt securities: Modern evidence, Review of Financial Studies, 1997, 
10(4), 1175-1202. 
 
Gande, Amar, Puri, Manju and Saunders, Anthony, 1999. Bank entry, competition and 
the market for corporate securities underwriting, with A. Gande and Anthony Saunders, 
Journal of Financial Economics, 54(2), 165-195.  
 
Houston, Joel, Ryngaert, Michael, 1994. The overall gains from large bank mergers. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 18, 1155-1176.  
Johnson, Simon, 2009. The quiet coup. Atlantic Monthly, May.  
Kane, Edward J. 1987. Competitive financial reregulation: An international perspective. 
In R. Portes and A. Swoboda (eds.) Threats to international financial stability. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kane, Edward J. 2001. Relevance and need for international regulatory standards. 
Brookings-Wharton papers on financial services. 87-115. 
Laeven, Luc, Levine, Ross, 2007. Is there a diversification discount in financial 
conglomerates? Journal of Financial Economics 85, 331-367. 
McKinsey & Co. 2008. Sustaining New York’s and the US’ global financial services 
leadership. Report commissioned by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Senator Charles 
Schumer. Mayor’s Office of the City of New York. Available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/ny_report_final.pdf 
Puri, Manju, 1994 The long-term default performance of bank underwritten security 
issues, Journal of Banking and Finance, 18(2), 397-418. 
 
Puri, Manju, 1996 Commercial banks in investment banking: Conflict of interest or 
certification role? Journal of Financial Economics, 40(3), 373-401. 
 
Puri, Manju, 1999. Commercial banks as underwriters: Implications for the going public 
process, Journal of Financial Economics, 54(2), 133-163. 
Saunders, Anthony and Ingo Walter, 1994. Universal banking in the United States. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Schmid, Markus M., Walter, Ingo, 2008. Do financial conglomerates create or destroy 
economic value? Journal of Financial Intermediation, forthcoming.   
34 
 
US Department of the Treasury, 2009. Bank regulatory reform. Rebuilding financial 
supervision and regulation. Washington, D.C. US Government Printing Office. 
Walter, Ingo, 2004. Mergers and acquisitions in banking and finance. Oxford University 
Press, New York. 
  
35 
 
Exhibit 1
 
Exhibit 2
Citigroup Share Price Since the Merger
(6 April 1998 – Present, Compared to JP Morgan and S&P 500 Index)
Source: http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/advchart/frames/frames.asp?symb=&time=&freq=   
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Exhibit 3
Strategic Opportunity Set Facing Financial Conglomerates
Source: Ingo Walter, Mergers and Acquisitions in Banking and Finance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), Chapter 3.  
Exhibit 4
Consolidation in Global Wholesale Banking
Alan D. Morrison and William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Investment Banking: Institutions, politics and Law (New York: Oxford University Press,  2007).   
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Bank DCM ECM Loans M&A Total Share
JPMorgan 764 1,294 121 337 2,516 18.8
BAC-ML 648 584 594 339 2,165 16.2
Goldman Sachs 417 880 29 458 1,784 13.3
Citigroup 601 474 116 361 1,552 11.6
UBS 319 503 35 425 1,282 9.6
Deutsche Bank 465 411 68 208 1,152 8.6
Credit Suisse 425 474 19 203 1,121 8.4
Barclays Capital 558 226 42 99 925 6.9
Morgan Stanley 405 749 7 365 780 5.8
RBS 408 229 68 0 708 5.2
HHI = 0 < 1,276.3 < 10,000
Source: Dealogic, July 2009.
Exhibit 5
Top‐10 Global Wholesale Banking Firms – Gross Revenues First‐Half 2009
 
Exhibit 6
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Share Prices, 1989‐2009
(Compared to S&P 500 Index)
Source: http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/advchart/frames/frames.asp?symb=&time=&freq=   
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Exhibit 7
TARP-plus: US Government Bailout Commitments as of 10 February 2009                     
 
 
 
 
